tp203.xml
Title
tp203.xml
Source
born-digital
Media Type
story
Date Entered
2003-03-10
TomPaine Story: Story
"Preemptive or preventive war?"
As media speculation about war with Iraq reaches frenzied proportions, commentators insist on mistakenly terming the impending conflict "preemptive." As Harold Meyerson wrote for The American Prospect this week, "Democrats have said virtually nothing about Bush's stunning announcement that the United States is now free to wage preemptive -- if need be, nuclear -- war.
But the war the U.S. is planning against Iraq isnt preemptive. As any student of introduction to international relations could tell you, Bush and his advisors are preparing to wage a preventive war. Whats the difference ñ and why does it matter?
A nation wages preemptive war when it believes an attack on itself to be imminent and war unavoidable. Although preemptive war is rare, a typical example is the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and its neighbors. The trigger was the decision by Egyptian leader Gemal Abdul Nasser to close the critical Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and to mass troops in the Sinai Desert. Israel, fearing a concerted attack
by her Arab neighbors at any moment, struck first, and won a decisive and stunning victory.
Preventive war, on the hand, is launched when a nation believes an adversary is growing stronger and that war must be fought sooner rather than later, when the military balance might be less favorable. While these wars have become increasingly infrequent, the best-known modern example also involves Israel, in the 1956 Suez War. The Israelis, fearing a realignment of the military balance in the region after the
1955 Soviet arms sale to the Egyptians, conspired with Britain and France to seize the Suez Canal before Soviet arms could be fully integrated into Nassers military.
With this distinction in mind, it becomes clear that the U.S. isnt planning a preemptive war, since Iraq cannot plausibly attack the United States and since Saddam has no immediate plan for aggression against his neighbors. Judging from the avowed justification for such a war, it can only be termed preventive. As Peter Beinart put it in The New Republic, the whole point of acting now is that once Saddam has, say, a nuclear bomb, he'll also be able to deter us.
In other words, the U.S. fears that if and when Iraq acquires weapons of mass destruction, the regional military calculus will be altered in Iraqs favor, limited U.S. freedom of action in the Middle East. The widespread fear that Saddam would provide nukes or biological weapons to international terrorists like al-Qaeda also provides justification for preventive war enthusiasts.
But promoters of war with Iraq continue to call for preemptive war for two reasons. First, some opinion leaders and commentators are probably unaware of the distinction between preventive and preemptive war. But secondly, and more importantly, terming the impeding U.S. attack preemptive serves an important political purpose: convincing
voters that full-scale war is necessary to derail Saddams immediate plans to kill Americans.
However, the difference between these two kinds of warfare is not limited to the sphere of public manipulation. The international community reacts quite differently to one as opposed to the other. Israel has clearly won the public relations battle over whether the 1967 war was necessary-- most reasonable people will concede that the Israelis had little choice at the time.
But the Suez War was an entirely different story. International
condemnation was swift and devastating. Even U.S. President Eisenhower abandoned Israel and his NATO allies by insisting on an immediate cessation of hostilities along with British and French withdrawal from the canal itself. The Suez War now ranks as perhaps Israels greatest military and policy disaster.
The international reaction to a U.S. attack on Iraq is not likely to be much different. The world community has a long history of frowning on unprovoked wars, whether those wars aim for conquest or prevention. A host of Arab and European regimes have already announced their opposition to war, including Jordan, Turkey, and Germany. Convincing them of the necessity of starting a war will be difficult if not impossible.
Saddam is certainly guilty of a long line of atrocities and aggression against his neighbors and his own citizens. From the brutal war he initiated against neighboring Iran in 1980 (which ultimately killed one million people) to the long-running campaign of oppression and extermination against Iraqs own Kurdish minority to the notorious invasion of Kuwait, Saddam is a proven menace both to the Iraqi people and to bordering states.
However, it would be a gross violation of widely-accepted international precedent to launch an aggressive war based on past depredations. Internationally, such a flimsy prerequisite for war would give states an excuse to attack their neighbors based on past aggression and trumped-up charges of weapons-development or harboring terrorists. India could invade Pakistan, claiming its history of aggression in
Kashmir combined with its long-range missile development program as reason enough for war.
To most international observers, it is clear that Iraqs past
misbehavior, however debased and frequent, is not reason enough to provoke a full-scale war between two well-armed powers in a region that can charitably be termed a powder keg. In addition to setting a dangerous precedent in international relations, an unprovoked preventive war initiated by the U.S. would only serve to inflame the anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment that led to the atrocities of September 11 and perhaps precipitate the use of chemical or biological
weapons by a cornered Saddam.
The language of preemption is designed to overcome these reservations, to persuade the international community that Iraqi aggression is both inevitable and close at hand. Principled opponents of war must not let the administration and its supporters get away with this gross conceptual perversion.
After all, the only imminent attack, and the only seemingly unavoidable war, is the one being plotted at this very moment by the Bush administration.
As media speculation about war with Iraq reaches frenzied proportions, commentators insist on mistakenly terming the impending conflict "preemptive." As Harold Meyerson wrote for The American Prospect this week, "Democrats have said virtually nothing about Bush's stunning announcement that the United States is now free to wage preemptive -- if need be, nuclear -- war.
But the war the U.S. is planning against Iraq isnt preemptive. As any student of introduction to international relations could tell you, Bush and his advisors are preparing to wage a preventive war. Whats the difference ñ and why does it matter?
A nation wages preemptive war when it believes an attack on itself to be imminent and war unavoidable. Although preemptive war is rare, a typical example is the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and its neighbors. The trigger was the decision by Egyptian leader Gemal Abdul Nasser to close the critical Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and to mass troops in the Sinai Desert. Israel, fearing a concerted attack
by her Arab neighbors at any moment, struck first, and won a decisive and stunning victory.
Preventive war, on the hand, is launched when a nation believes an adversary is growing stronger and that war must be fought sooner rather than later, when the military balance might be less favorable. While these wars have become increasingly infrequent, the best-known modern example also involves Israel, in the 1956 Suez War. The Israelis, fearing a realignment of the military balance in the region after the
1955 Soviet arms sale to the Egyptians, conspired with Britain and France to seize the Suez Canal before Soviet arms could be fully integrated into Nassers military.
With this distinction in mind, it becomes clear that the U.S. isnt planning a preemptive war, since Iraq cannot plausibly attack the United States and since Saddam has no immediate plan for aggression against his neighbors. Judging from the avowed justification for such a war, it can only be termed preventive. As Peter Beinart put it in The New Republic, the whole point of acting now is that once Saddam has, say, a nuclear bomb, he'll also be able to deter us.
In other words, the U.S. fears that if and when Iraq acquires weapons of mass destruction, the regional military calculus will be altered in Iraqs favor, limited U.S. freedom of action in the Middle East. The widespread fear that Saddam would provide nukes or biological weapons to international terrorists like al-Qaeda also provides justification for preventive war enthusiasts.
But promoters of war with Iraq continue to call for preemptive war for two reasons. First, some opinion leaders and commentators are probably unaware of the distinction between preventive and preemptive war. But secondly, and more importantly, terming the impeding U.S. attack preemptive serves an important political purpose: convincing
voters that full-scale war is necessary to derail Saddams immediate plans to kill Americans.
However, the difference between these two kinds of warfare is not limited to the sphere of public manipulation. The international community reacts quite differently to one as opposed to the other. Israel has clearly won the public relations battle over whether the 1967 war was necessary-- most reasonable people will concede that the Israelis had little choice at the time.
But the Suez War was an entirely different story. International
condemnation was swift and devastating. Even U.S. President Eisenhower abandoned Israel and his NATO allies by insisting on an immediate cessation of hostilities along with British and French withdrawal from the canal itself. The Suez War now ranks as perhaps Israels greatest military and policy disaster.
The international reaction to a U.S. attack on Iraq is not likely to be much different. The world community has a long history of frowning on unprovoked wars, whether those wars aim for conquest or prevention. A host of Arab and European regimes have already announced their opposition to war, including Jordan, Turkey, and Germany. Convincing them of the necessity of starting a war will be difficult if not impossible.
Saddam is certainly guilty of a long line of atrocities and aggression against his neighbors and his own citizens. From the brutal war he initiated against neighboring Iran in 1980 (which ultimately killed one million people) to the long-running campaign of oppression and extermination against Iraqs own Kurdish minority to the notorious invasion of Kuwait, Saddam is a proven menace both to the Iraqi people and to bordering states.
However, it would be a gross violation of widely-accepted international precedent to launch an aggressive war based on past depredations. Internationally, such a flimsy prerequisite for war would give states an excuse to attack their neighbors based on past aggression and trumped-up charges of weapons-development or harboring terrorists. India could invade Pakistan, claiming its history of aggression in
Kashmir combined with its long-range missile development program as reason enough for war.
To most international observers, it is clear that Iraqs past
misbehavior, however debased and frequent, is not reason enough to provoke a full-scale war between two well-armed powers in a region that can charitably be termed a powder keg. In addition to setting a dangerous precedent in international relations, an unprovoked preventive war initiated by the U.S. would only serve to inflame the anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment that led to the atrocities of September 11 and perhaps precipitate the use of chemical or biological
weapons by a cornered Saddam.
The language of preemption is designed to overcome these reservations, to persuade the international community that Iraqi aggression is both inevitable and close at hand. Principled opponents of war must not let the administration and its supporters get away with this gross conceptual perversion.
After all, the only imminent attack, and the only seemingly unavoidable war, is the one being plotted at this very moment by the Bush administration.
Collection
Citation
“tp203.xml,” September 11 Digital Archive, accessed December 27, 2024, https://911digitalarchive.org/items/show/625.