[MAPC-discuss] IT AIN'T OVER 'TILL IT'S OVER: What to watch for

[MAPC-discuss] IT AIN'T OVER 'TILL IT'S OVER: What to watch for

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2001-11-16

IT AIN'T OVER 'TILL IT'S OVER:
What to watch for in Afghanistan

By X

The fall of Kabul and other Afghan
cities has led many Americans to
believe that the war is swiftly drawing to a
close.  The U.S. media is creating the
impression that the takeover has brought 23
years of war, instability and oppression to an
end. Nothing could be farther from
the truth.  Paraphrasing Yogi Berra,
the war ain't over 'till it's over.

First, in a country that traditionally
has lacked centralized authority, the takeover
of the capital city does not yet mean the
conquest of all of Afghanistan.  Taliban
forces are regrouping in and around their
de facto capital of Kandahar,
where some factions plan to wage a
guerrilla war.  Afghans did not beat
the British and Russian invaders by
holding the cities, but by waging ferocious
resistance from mountain strongholds.
If Taliban or other Pashtun fighters launch a
Chechen-style hit-and-run defense, the
war could drag on for years.
The result of a new guerrilla war
would be the complete ethnic partition
of Afghanistan into a Pashtun south and
non-Pashtun north.  The media has highlighted
the renewed food aid shipments into
Afghanistan, but without noting that food
has been used by all sides as a weapon,
with militias seizing aid
shipments for their supporters, and blocking
food from their enemy's territory.

Second, the Northern Alliance rebels' seizure
of Kabul merely resets the clock
back to 1992, when as the mujahadin
they took the city from Najibullah's Communists.
Not only did the non-Pashtun mujahadin
execute Pashtuns, and legislate the first
limits on women's rights, but they quickly
turned on each other.  Their four years of
in-fighting left 50,000 dead, and led Afghans
and the West to welcome the Taliban as
stabilizing "liberators" in 1996. Since then,
Northern Alliance rebels have had a reputation
as corrupt "looters and rapists," according
to a recent statement by the Revolutionary
Association of Women of Afghanistan
(RAWA), and have taken control
of up to 80 percent of Afghanistan's
opium trade.  The returning Northern
Alliance rebels are again executing Pashtuns
in the city, much as returning Albanians
attacked Serbs in Kosovo two years ago.
But the Northern Alliance seizure
of Kabul gives it a central role in any new
Afghan "coalition" government, because
possession is nine-tenths of the law.

Third, even if the U.S. or U.N. manages
to form a shaky "coalition" government,
the conflict may only restart, as
it did in 1992 and in 1996.  All Afghan
ethnic and political factions will assume
their claim to power will be recognized by
the U.S. powerbrokers. When they realize that
Washington intends to split the difference, some of
them may quickly turn on their former allies.
Washington attempted to build a multiethnic coalition
under the aging King Zahir Shah in
1992, and failed miserably.  It tried to build
a similar coalition that same year in Somalia.
One of the fundamental errors made
by the U.S. in Somalia was an assumption that
its unifying intentions would magically satisfy
all militia factions.  The other mistake it made
was to only recognize militia warlords as
legitimate political players, and ignore civil society
and clan elders. An Afghan regime that only patches
together the guys with the guns, and leaves out the
vast majority of Afghan women and men,
will merely reward the past two decades of
violence, and set up up another U.N. "peacekeeping"
force for failure.

The West supported the mujahadin takeover
of Kabul in 1992, the Taliban takeover in 1996,
and now the Northern Alliance takeover
in 2001. Its aims were usually to  "liberate"
Afghanistan from the last regime it supported.
Washington's initial support for militant Islamist
groups in Afghanistan
(like Israel's support of Hamas, and Egypt's
support of the Muslim Brotherhood) ultimately
blew up in its face.  Yet because the militant Islamists
are today virtually the force exploiting
public opposition to poverty, corruption,
and foreign occupation in the Muslim world,
repressing them only legitimizes their growing
popularity. Instead of backing or repressing far-right
Islamic populist groups, the West and its
client governments could be posing popular alternatives
to draw frustrated citizens away from them.
Instead, the U.S. is merely
repeating old mistakes by crushing the Taliban,
while hailing new Islamist militant groups such
as the Northern Alliance.

But there is a method to this madness, more
to U.S. aims in the region than is readily apparent.
Afghanistan has historically been in an
extremely strategic location straddling South Asia,
Central Asia, and the Middle East. Will the U.S.
attempt to use the current crisis to establish a permanent
presence in the region?
Each recent large U.S. intervention has left behind a
string of new military bases in a region where
they had never before had a foothold  The
Gulf War left behind large U.S. bases in
Saudi Arabia and three other Gulf states--the main
Bin Laden grievance that fueled the September 11 attacks.
Military interventions in former Yugoslavia resulted in
U.S. bases in four countries, including
the sprawling Camp Bondsteel complex in
Kosovo.  Were the military bases merely
built to aid the interventions, or did the interventions
occur partly in order to station the bases?

The U.S. military is inserting itself into
strategic areas of the world, and anchoring U.S.
geopolitical influence in these areas, at a very critical
time in history.  With the rise of a new
European economic superpower, and
increased economic competition from
East Asia, U.S. economic power is perhaps
on the wane.  But in military affairs,
the U.S. is still the unquestioned superpower.
Why not project that military dominance
into new strategic regions as
a future counterweight to its competitors?
French President Jacques Chirac
correctly viewed the U.S. role in the Persian
Guld as securing control over oil sources
for Europe and Japan. Afghanistan lies
along a proposed Unocal pipeline route
from new Caspian Sea oil fields to the Indian
Ocean.  Allied checkpoints are now being
set up along the Afghan highways that
would serve as potential routes for the
pipeline.

Major tests for U.S. policy lie in the days
and weeks ahead.  Will special forces switch
to fighting against guerrillas in Afghani
or Pakistani mountains?  Will Bush
flatten Kandahar like Putin flattened the
Chechen capital of Grozny last year?
Will the Northern Alliance be allowed
to dominate Kabul (like the Kosovo
Liberation Army became the UN "police
force" in  Kosovo)?  Will a new "coalition"
government stay together, or only give a
seat at the table to anyone carrying a
Kalashnikov or RPG launcher?

Will Bin Laden really be captured, or
(like Saddam) be allowed to live in order
to justify a permanent stationing of U.S. troops?
Will anthrax be used as a new
excuse to bomb and invade Iraq?
Finally, will the new U.S. military
bases in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan and Pakistan become permanent
outposts guarding a new oil infrastructure?
A failure of the U.S. to pull out of the region
after the war, to leave behind a government
that truly represents Afghani civilians, or
to lure Muslims away from militant
groups, will only give impetus to new
Bin Ladens, and to future September 11s.


X is a doctoral candidate in
Geography at the University of Wisconsin-Madison,
and a member of the South-West Asia
Information Group.
X


Also see:
A history of biochemical weapons
http://madison.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=1522&group=webcast
List of U.S. military interventions since 1890
http://www.zmag.org/list2.htm
A briefing on the history of U.S. interventions
http://www.zmag.org/grossmanciv.htm
Afghanistan is not simply like Vietnam
http://www.badgerherald.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2001/09/30/3bb7cc953e5bd

WORT interview with Robert Fisk
http://madison.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=1127&group=webcast
WORT interview with Ahmed Rashid
http://madison.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=1272&group=webcast








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Friday, November 16, 2001 12:45 AM

[MAPC-discuss] IT AIN'T OVER 'TILL IT'S OVER: What to watch for